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would otherwise prefer. Consistent with the mixed results reported in prior studies, we find no relation 
between various corporate governance mechanisms and tax avoidance at the conditional mean and 
median of the tax avoidance distribution. However, using quantile regression, we find a positive relation 
between board independence and financial sophistication for low levels of tax avoidance, but a negative 
relation for high levels of tax avoidance. These results indicate that these governance attributes have a 
stronger relation with more extreme levels of tax avoidance, which are more likely to be symptomatic of 
over- and under-investment by managers.  
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1. Introduction 
We examine the role of governance in tax planning decisions to help resolve the debate in 
the governance and tax literatures about whether a link exists between firms’ corporate 
governance structures, including managers’ incentive-compensation contracts, and corporate tax 
avoidance. The debate exists, in part, because prior research relies on Desai and Dharmapala’s 
(2006) theory that provides counterintuitive predictions about the link between governance and 
tax avoidance decisions. In particular, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that tax avoidance 
and managerial rent extraction can be complementary if tax avoidance reduces corporate 
transparency which, in turn, increases the opportunity for managers to divert corporate resources 
for personal benefit. Hence, their theory suggests that reducing tax planning can simultaneously 
reduce managerial diversion. Desai and Dharmapala further assume that well-governed firms are 
more likely to have internal control mechanisms to prevent such diversion and argue that a 
negative relation between managers’ equity incentives and tax avoidance will only manifest in 
well-governed firms. In contrast, they assume that poorly governed firms will not use equity 
incentives to encourage tax avoidance because they lack the governance mechanisms to prevent 
managerial diversion. 
While Desai and Dharmapala’s theory is provocative, it has a number of important 
limitations. For example, Desai and Dharmapala fail to acknowledge that equity incentives are, 
themselves, an important governance mechanism (i.e., managers’ equity incentives result from 
endogenous decisions by the board of directors that are, in part, aimed at mitigating agency 
problems). It is also unclear why well-governed firms would be more likely to rely on equity 
incentives than poorly-governed firms. If anything, prior studies suggest that managerial equity 
incentives can substitute for other governance mechanisms where more direct monitoring is 
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either too costly or infeasible (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Core and Guay, 1999). Prior 
studies also suggest that poorly-governed firms (where managers have “control of the board”) 
are more likely to over-pay managers in the form of equity (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). 
Moreover, these same managers should have strong incentives to reduce tax payments and 
personally capture the resulting economic benefits (because of the lax oversight). Therefore, 
similar to their well-governed counterparts, poorly-governed firms should also exhibit a negative 
relation between equity incentives and tax avoidance. This chain of reasoning calls into question 
Desai and Dharmapala’s conjecture that the relation between equity incentives and tax avoidance 
should only exist in well-governed firms. 
In contrast to Desai and Dharmapala, we adopt a more traditional view of the role of 
governance on firms’ tax avoidance. Under our alternative agency-theoretic view, tax avoidance 
is one of many risky investment opportunities available to management. Similar to other 
investment decisions, unresolved agency problems can lead managers to select a level of tax 
avoidance that differs from what shareholders would prefer. We do not assume that tax 
avoidance necessarily results in opportunities for managerial diversion. Rather, as with other 
agency problems, we assume that the various governance mechanisms in place, including 
managers’ incentive-compensation contracts, can mitigate agency problems with respect to tax 
avoidance.  
Other papers directly examine the link between corporate governance and tax avoidance. 
Minnick and Noga (2010) investigate whether several measures of corporate governance are 
associated with a variety of proxies intended to capture firms’ level of tax avoidance, but find 
little evidence of a link. Rego and Wilson (2012) find that firms at which managers have 
relatively large risk-taking equity incentives engage in more tax avoidance. However, they fail to 
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find evidence of a relation between other governance mechanisms and tax avoidance. Finally, in 
a concurrent study, Robinson et al. (2012) report evidence that audit committee financial 
expertise is generally positively associated with tax planning, but that this association is negative 
when tax planning is thought to be risky (i.e., aggressive). Overall, the relationships among 
corporate governance, managerial equity incentives, and tax avoidance are mixed and result in 
inconclusive inferences in the existing literature. 
One common theme across prior studies is that inferences are based on estimates of how 
governance relates to the conditional mean of the tax avoidance distribution. However, the 
relationship between governance and the (conditional) average level of tax avoidance may not 
accurately describe the relationship in other parts of the tax avoidance distribution. Rather than 
rely solely on traditional econometric methods (i.e., ordinary least squares regression) that only 
provide estimates of the average relationship, we also estimate a series of quantile regressions to 
assess the relation across the entire tax avoidance distribution. This research design follows 
naturally from our conjecture that the relationship between corporate governance and tax 
avoidance will differ at relatively high and low levels of tax avoidance. In particular, boards that 
are more knowledgeable about the net benefits of tax strategies should encourage more tax 
planning at lower levels of tax avoidance because this improves cash flows with little 
accompanying risk. Conversely, more knowledgeable boards should discourage additional tax 
avoidance when the level is high because the increased costs (e.g., regulatory or reputational) are 
more likely to outweigh the marginal benefit of additional tax savings.  
We examine a sample of firms between 2007 and 2011 and find that CEOs’ risk-taking 
equity incentives exhibit a positive relationship with the average level (i.e., conditional mean) of 
tax avoidance. This result is analogous to the positive relationship between risk-taking equity 
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incentives and earnings management reported by Armstrong et al. (2013) and is consistent with 
our characterization of tax avoidance as a risky positive expected net present value investment 
from the perspective of CEOs. More importantly, we find that this relationship is stronger for 
higher levels of tax avoidance, which suggests that managerial risk-taking incentives are an 
important determinant of aggressive tax positions that are likely to entail more risk. 
We also examine how other governance mechanisms relate to observed levels of tax 
avoidance. In particular, we examine two important attributes of the board: financial expertise (to 
measure knowledge of the costs and benefits of tax avoidance) and independence (to measure the 
ability and incentive to monitor managers’ tax avoidance decisions). We find that the relation 
between boards’ financial expertise and independence and the level of tax avoidance differs 
considerably across the tax avoidance distribution. Specifically, we find that board financial 
expertise and independence both have a positive relation with tax avoidance for low levels of tax 
avoidance, which is consistent with under-investment in tax avoidance in the absence of 
monitoring. We also find that board financial expertise and independence both have a negative 
relation with tax avoidance for high levels of the tax avoidance, which is also consistent with 
over-investment in tax avoidance in the absence of monitoring. Collectively, these findings 
suggest that more financially sophisticated and more independent boards attenuate relatively 
extreme levels of tax avoidance, which are likely to be symptomatic of unresolved agency 
problems. 
Because our findings are at odds with the predictions from Desai and Dharmapala’s 
model, we attempt to reconcile the two sets of results. Consistent with Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006), we find that an interaction between an indicator of “good” governance and top 
executives’ stock option compensation exhibits no relation with tax avoidance based on ordinary 
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least squares estimates of the conditional mean. However, quantile regression estimates of their 
specification indicate a strong negative relation for high levels of tax avoidance and no relation 
for low levels. These estimates suggest that “good” corporate governance mitigates over-
investment in high levels of tax avoidance that would otherwise occur when executives receive 
large stock option grants. Thus, in contrast to Desai and Dharmapala (2006), we find that 
corporate governance appears to be related to managers’ tax avoidance decisions, but only for 
high levels of tax avoidance. Importantly, this relationship is not apparent from examining the 
average level of tax avoidance. Our findings call into question whether tax avoidance and 
managerial rent extraction are, in fact, complementary activities as predicted by Desai and 
Dharmapala, and whether boards view them as such. If tax avoidance is instead better 
characterized as one of many alternative risky investment opportunities as our results suggest, 
then studies that interpret low levels of (i.e., underinvestment in) tax avoidance as a symptom of 
“good governance” should be reevaluated (e.g., Chen et al., 2010). 
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two discusses competing 
theories for the relation between corporate governance and tax avoidance and provides 
arguments for why the relation may vary for different levels of tax avoidance. Section three 
describes our sample. Section four discusses our research design and explains our choice of 
quantile regression estimation. Section five presents our primary empirical results and 
inferences. Section six discusses additional supplemental analysis and our reexamination of 
Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) findings. Section seven provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Prior Literature 
A mature stream of corporate tax research examines the determinants of effective tax 
rates and book-tax differences (e.g., Gupta and Newberry, 1997). Subsequent studies (e.g., Mills 
and Newberry, 2001 and Cloyd et al., 1996) focus on the book-tax tradeoffs that are associated 
with various tax avoidance opportunities (i.e., some tax avoidance strategies reduce both taxable 
and financial statement income, whereas others affect only taxable income). Although this prior 
research is useful, it provides little insight into why some firms engage in more tax planning than 
others (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001).  
This gap in the literature spurred a series of papers that more directly examine the 
determinants of corporate tax avoidance.
1
 For example, Dyreng et al. (2010) report evidence that 
executives who were previously employed by firms that are characterized as tax aggressive seem 
to import this aggressiveness to their new employer. Slemrod (2004), Crocker and Slemrod 
(2005), and Chen and Chu (2005) suggest that corporate tax noncompliance (i.e., extreme tax 
avoidance) could result from the tax reporting incentives provided by managers’ incentive-
compensation contracts. Consistent with this notion, there is empirical evidence that tax 
avoidance is associated with greater levels of incentive compensation (e.g., Phillips, 2003; 
Armstrong et al., 2012; Rego and Wilson, 2012).  
There is little research that directly examines whether (or how) corporate governance 
affects tax avoidance. As discussed in the previous section, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
                                                          
1
 A related set of studies attempts to identify and validate measures of tax avoidance. For example, Frank et al. 
(2009), Wilson (2009), Lisowsky (2010), and Dyreng et al. (2008) develop alternative measures of tax avoidance. 
Since the passage of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)’s Interpretation No. 48 (Accounting for 
Uncertainty in Income Taxes) (hereafter FIN 48), several recent papers measure firms’ tax aggressiveness using the 
magnitude of their uncertain tax benefits (e.g., Rego and Wilson, 2012; Lisowsky et al., 2013). As we discuss in 
more detail below, we carefully consider the specific attribute of tax avoidance that is called for by our research 
question (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010).  
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develop and test a model that links managers’ equity-based compensation to aggressive tax 
avoidance. They conjecture the existence of complementarities between tax-sheltering and rent 
extraction. The essence of their argument is that managers of well-governed firms will have 
greater incentives for tax avoidance because the presence of other governance mechanisms will 
prevent these managers from extracting the rents that are generated from their tax avoidance 
activities. In contrast, managers of poorly-governed firms will not have incentives for aggressive 
tax avoidance because the lack of monitoring and oversight would otherwise allow these 
managers to extract the rents that are generated from their aggressive tax planning.  
Recent work questions several of the fundamental assumptions in Desai and 
Dharmapala’s model. For example, their model assumes that managers can extract rents 
generated by tax avoidance because operational complexity (and the accompanying information 
asymmetry) results in a more opaque information environment and therefore lowers the cost and 
expands the scope for rent extraction. However, Gallemore and Labro (2014) find that tax 
avoidance is associated with higher quality (internal) information environments and the precise 
channels through which managers extract (or personally benefit from) the rents that are 
generated from tax avoidance are not clear. Moreover, there is limited empirical evidence that 
managers do, in fact, extract rents that are generated by tax avoidance.
2
 Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006) also implicitly assume that equity-based compensation does not provide a direct, 
mechanical tax benefit in the form of a tax shield. Seidman and Stomberg (2011) challenge this 
assumption and find that firms with higher levels of equity-based compensation are less likely to 
benefit from additional tax avoidance. Seidman and Stomberg (2011) suggest that Desai and 
                                                          
2
 Desai et al. (2007) present evidence that Russian oligarchs appear to extract meaningful rents from firms that avoid 
more taxes. However, the authors do not find evidence that this is the case for Russian firms that operate in 
regulated (e.g., U.S.) markets. Blaylock (2011) also fails to find evidence that managers of U.S. firms extract 
economically meaningful rents through tax avoidance.  
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Dharmapala’s association between equity compensation and tax avoidance can be explained by 
“tax exhaustion.”
3
  
In a related concurrent study, Robinson et al. (2012) also examine the association 
between incentives and governance for both general and “risky” forms of tax avoidance.
4
 
Robinson et al. report that the proportion of accounting experts on the board is associated with 
more general and less “risky” tax planning. To the extent their measure of “risky” tax planning 
explains variation in relatively extreme levels of tax avoidance (i.e., the right tail of the tax 
avoidance distribution), our findings regarding the relation between board financial expertise and 
tax avoidance are consistent with those of Robinson et al. (2012). However, one important 
difference between our study and Robinson et al. is that we also examine the effect of 
governance and incentives on tax avoidance across the entire tax avoidance distribution, which 
provides better insight into the link between governance and tax avoidance. For example, firms 
in the left tail of the (conditional) tax avoidance distribution are those that engage in less tax 
avoidance than expected (i.e., “under-shelter”), and constitute an important and unresolved 
puzzle in the tax literature.
5
 Our findings also shed light on the relation between various 
governance mechanisms and tax avoidance of these firms. 
In summary, although extant literature provides some insight into the role of incentives 
on tax avoidance, inferences are still limited regarding whether (and how) corporate governance 
                                                          
3
 Graham et al. (2006) suggest that firms require fewer alternative tax shelters if they utilize more stock option 
grants. This “tax exhaustion” occurs because option exercises provide the corporation with tax deductions, which 
reduces the need to engage in alternative tax avoidance strategies. The same reasoning can also be found in the 
equity incentives literature. For example, Core and Guay (1999, 159) argue that “when future corporate tax rates are 
expected to be higher, the future tax deduction from deferred compensation becomes more favorable relative to the 
immediate tax deduction received from cash compensation.” 
4
 Robinson et al. (2012) measure risky tax planning using estimates of tax shelter likelihood derived from the level 
of activity in tax havens (Dyreng and Lindsey, 2009; Balakrishnan et al., 2012) and the shelter estimation models 
described in Wilson (2009) and Lisowsky (2010). They also use the predicted uncertain tax benefits as an additional 
proxy for firms’ involvement in risky tax planning following Cazier et al. (2009) and Rego and Wilson (2012).  
5
 The lack of evidence of significant costs of tax avoidance is frequently referred to in the literature as the “under-
sheltering puzzle” (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Weisbach, 2002; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; and Gallemore 
et al., 2012). 
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influences firms’ tax avoidance. Moreover, the evidence that does exist is confined to explaining 
the conditional mean of the tax avoidance distribution, but does not describe the relation in other, 
potentially more interesting and informative parts of the distribution—most notably in the tails.  
2.2. Research hypotheses 
2.2.1. Managerial incentives 
The majority of most CEOs’ monetary incentives stem from changes in the value of their 
equity holdings. Prior studies discuss how the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio to changes 
in stock price, or delta, has two opposing effects on their risky project selection decisions. On 
one hand, since delta captures the sensitivity of a CEO’s wealth to stock price, it encourages 
CEOs to take risks that are expected to generate a sufficient increase in stock price. On the other 
hand, Armstrong et al. (2013) note that delta also “amplifies the effect of equity risk on the total 
riskiness of the manager’s portfolio,” which discourages risk-averse managers from pursuing 
risky projects. As a result of these two opposing effects, the net incentive effect of delta is 
theoretically ambiguous for risky projects. If CEOs believe that the increase in stock price will 
more than offset the accompanying increase in equity risk associated with aggressive tax 
positions, then delta should encourage tax avoidance. Alternatively, if CEOs believe that the risk 
to their equity wealth exceeds any increase in stock price from adopting aggressive tax positions, 
then delta should discourage tax avoidance. Because of these opposing effects, it is not clear 
whether CEOs’ equity portfolio delta will be positively or negatively associated with tax 
avoidance across the distribution.  
Unlike delta, the sensitivity of a CEO’s equity portfolio value to changes in stock return 
volatility, or vega, provides them with an unambiguous incentive to take risk.
6
 Therefore, if 
                                                          
6
 Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012) develop a numerical example that shows that although equity portfolio vega 
provides risk-averse CEOs with incentives to take both systematic and idiosyncratic risk, the incentive to take 
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CEOs believe that more aggressive tax avoidance increases stock price volatility, we expect vega 
to have a positive relation with tax avoidance. Moreover, the magnitude of this relation should be 
higher (lower) in the right (left) tail of the tax avoidance distribution where there is thought to be 
more (less) risk associated with the tax avoidance. This prediction is similar to that in Rego and 
Wilson (2012), except that we also predict a stronger relation at higher levels—and, conversely, 
a weaker relation at lower levels—of the tax avoidance distribution. 
2.2.2. Board characteristics 
Similar to other activities that entail both costs and benefits, the effect of tax avoidance 
on firm value should be concave with an interior optimum. In particular, there are likely to be 
positive net benefits (e.g., cash savings) from engaging in tax avoidance up to some firm-specific 
optimal level. Beyond this point, the marginal cost of additional tax avoidance (e.g., costs related 
to structuring complicated tax transactions, an inability to repatriate and invest foreign earnings, 
and potential political, regulatory, or reputational costs that are detrimental to future operations) 
exceeds the marginal benefit.
7
 If shareholders and managers have different preferences for tax 
avoidance then governance mechanisms will be used to influence managers’ tax avoidance 
decisions. For example, certain governance mechanisms may prevent (or mitigate) over- and 
under-investment in tax avoidance. Although a firm’s governance structure is comprised of a 
complex set of contracts, relationships, and institutional features, we focus on governance 
mechanisms that we believe are closely related to tax decisions. Specifically, we focus on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
systematic risk is stronger than the incentive to take idiosyncratic risk. Our analysis does not distinguish between the 
nature of the risk (i.e., systematic versus idiosyncratic) associated with tax avoidance and does not rely on the 
differential strength of risk-taking incentives provided by vega. Our analysis instead relies on vega providing CEOs 
with incentives to take both types of risk.  
7
 For example, some studies suggest that firms incur potential tax penalties and reputational costs (e.g., Chen et al., 
2010) or face significant costs defending aggressive tax positions (e.g., Rego and Wilson, 2012). Although there is 
little direct evidence supporting the existence of explicit reputational costs (e.g., Gallemore et al., 2012; Hanlon and 
Slemrod, 2009), there is clearly some underlying cost of extreme tax avoidance because not all firms have extremely 
low effective tax rates. 
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financial sophistication and independence of the board. We expect that more financially 
sophisticated boards will be better able to monitor their firm’s tax positions. This prediction is 
consistent with recent guidance that recommends that tax issues, including implementing and 
monitoring tax planning, should be placed on the audit committee’s agenda and, more generally, 
advocates “greater awareness in the Boardroom of the importance of tax issues.”
8
 Accordingly, 
we predict a positive (negative) relation between the financial sophistication of boards and tax 
avoidance in the left (right) tail of the tax avoidance distribution. The extent to which 
independent directors affect a firm’s tax policy is not ex ante clear. Independent directors may 
not have sufficient firm-specific expertise to affect firm tax policy. Alternatively, they may be 
able to draw on outside experience with other firms’ tax positions and therefore be more likely to 
influence tax planning activities. Independent directors should recognize that there are potential 
costs associated with extreme tax positions and, consequently, should attempt to mitigate 
extreme tax avoidance. If independent directors monitor managers’ tax positions or are otherwise 
sensitive to extreme tax avoidance, then we expect to find a positive (negative) relation between 
board independence in the lower (upper) tail of the tax avoidance distribution.  
 
3. Sample Selection 
 
Our sample selection starts with all firms listed on Compustat for the 2007-2011 fiscal 
years for which we have data to compute at least one of the tax attributes that we define below.
9
 
We eliminate foreign registrants and firms designated as real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
because these firms are subject to different tax rules. We also eliminate firms that have an annual 
                                                          
8
 See Jeffrey Owens, Good Corporate Governance: the Tax Dimension—OECD Forum on Tax Administration, 
September 2006 and Deloitte Hot Topics: Taxes: What the audit committee should know, October 2011. 
9
 As recommended by Lisowsky et al. (2013), we delete observations with missing Compustat data for 
ENDFIN48BAL. We also truncate ETR observations to be between zero and one. Because we use three-year ETRs, 
very few observations are truncated.  
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average stock price of less than $1.00 per share and firms with average total assets of less than 
$10,000. These requirements yield 12,275 firm-year observations. We then retain firm-year 
observations for which we have data available for our control variables (defined below). This 
yields 7,231 firm-year observations. Finally, we retain firm-years for which we have data 
available for our governance and incentives variables.
10
 This yields a final sample of between 
3,137 and 4,128 firm-year observations depending on the measure of tax avoidance.  
Table 1 Panel A provides descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in our analysis 
including measures of tax avoidance, governance, incentives, and the control variables. Table 1 
Panel B compares characteristics of our sample to those of the Compustat population for fiscal 
year 2009, which is the year that has the largest representation in our sample. Panel B shows that 
the firms in our sample are represented in each of the Barth et al. (1998) industry groups and, on 
average, are larger and more profitable than those in the broader Compustat population.  
 
4. Research Design 
Since our hypotheses relate to the extreme tails of the tax avoidance distribution, our 
primary statistical tests and inferences are based on quantile regression estimates. Quantile 
regression allows us to draw more complete inferences beyond those that can be drawn from 
traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, which only describe the relation between 
independent variables and the conditional mean of the dependent variable of interest. Quantile 
regression is more general and describes the relation between the independent variables and any 
specified percentile of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. In describing the 
                                                          
10
 We obtain governance and incentives data from Equilar, which is similar to the ExecuComp database in that it 
provides executive compensation and equity holdings data collected from annual proxy filings (Form DEF 14A) 
with the SEC. We use Equilar data because it provides more than twice as many annual observations as 
ExecuComp. 
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advantages of quantile regression, Hao and Naiman (2007) note that “the focus on the central 
location has long distracted researchers from using appropriate and relevant techniques to 
address research questions regarding noncentral locations on the response distribution. Using 
conditional-mean models (e.g., OLS regression) to address these questions may be inefficient or 
even miss the point of the research altogether. …A set of equally spaced conditional quantiles 
can characterize the shape of the conditional distribution in addition to its central location.”   
The essential features of quantile regression can be illustrated through the following 
example. Suppose that a researcher is interested in determining whether education affects pay to 
help inform public policy regarding subsidized education. Further suppose that estimates from an 
OLS regression of pay on the level of education (e.g., years of schooling) indicate a small 
positive association between education and pay, leading the researcher to infer that the average 
effect of education on pay is modest. The policy recommendation based on inferences from OLS 
might be that further education investment generates only modest pay benefits. Quantile 
regression estimates at the conditional 5
th
 percentile of the pay distribution might instead reveal a 
much larger association between education and pay, suggesting that the returns to education are 
much larger for low-paid workers, who are more likely to receive educational subsidies.  
In a related application, Eide and Showalter (1998) use quantile regression to determine 
whether the relation between school quality and standardized test performance differs across the 
conditional distribution of test performance. Their results indicate that per pupil expenditures “is 
a variable that is generally found to be insignificant in most regressions which focus on the mean 
effect. In the quantile regressions, the coefficient is … insignificant at the 0.25 quantile and 
higher, but is relatively large and significant for the bottom tail of the distribution suggesting that 
these expenditures may increase math scores for the lower part of the conditional distribution.” 
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Quantile regression has also been applied in finance and economics to assess the effects of 
401(K) participation on wealth (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004); the determinants of house 
prices (Zietz et al., 2008); the determinants of gender wage differences (Garcia et al., 2001); the 
effect of education on women’s labor market value (Buchinsky, 2002); and to evaluate value-at-
risk models (Gaglianone et al., 2011).  
In our research setting, quantile regression allows us to determine whether the relation 
between various governance characteristics and tax avoidance varies across the tax avoidance 
distribution. As discussed in Section 2, we expect that more financially knowledgeable and more 
independent boards will more actively engage managers about their tax choices when the level of 
tax avoidance departs from the average. Thus, any relation between managerial incentives or 
corporate governance and tax avoidance should be more pronounced in the tails of the tax 
avoidance distribution. From a methodological perspective, this prediction implies that the 
impact of managerial incentives and related governance mechanisms will alter the shape of the 
entire tax avoidance distribution, rather than simply shift its central location as described by the 
mean or median. Consistent with some of the results from prior studies, it is possible that the 
impact of governance is slight or negligible at the mean or median, yet strong at other points of 
the tax avoidance distribution. Since traditional OLS regression estimation methods do not detect 
anything other than a shift in central location (i.e., the conditional mean), we use quantile 
regression as our primary method of estimation. 
The basic intuition for quantile regression in the context of our hypotheses is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Conditioning on a particular governance mechanism may “rotate” the conditional tax 
avoidance cumulative distribution function (CDF) around the median in a counterclockwise 
manner. Such an effect would manifest as a negative (positive) coefficient on governance in the 
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right (left) tail of the tax avoidance distribution. However, in this example, the coefficient on 
governance at the median (i.e., the central location) would be zero. Since traditional OLS and 
median regression only estimates the relationship at the “center” of the distribution (i.e., the 
mean and median, respectively), these techniques cannot detect shifts elsewhere in the 
distribution of interest and would not detect the shifts illustrated in Figure 1. In contrast, quantile 
regression is more general and describes changes in both the location and shape of the 
distribution of interest.
11
 
4.1. Quantile regression specification 
To test our research hypotheses, we estimate the following specification using quantile 
regression.
12
  
TaxPositioni,t =  0i,t + 1LogNumFinExpi,t-1 + 2PctIndepi,t-1 +  
3LogNumDirsi,t-1 + 4LogCEOPortDeltai,t-1 +  
5 LogCEOPortVegai,t-1 + 6CFOpsi,t +  
7LogMVEi,t + 8LogForAssetsi,t +9GeoCompi,t  + εi,t,  (1) 
 
TaxPosition is one of two proxies that measure a firm’s level of tax avoidance for a given year. 
Our first proxy for tax avoidance is EndFin48Bal, which we measure as the ending balance of 
the firm’s uncertain tax benefit (“UTB”) account (Compustat item TXTUBEND) scaled by total 
assets. The UTB represents management’s estimate of the amount of tax savings generated by 
                                                          
11
 To better understand the technical aspects of quantile regression, recall that OLS regression minimizes the 
following loss function: min𝑎,𝑏 ∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑏)
2. Quantile regression is similar in that it minimizes an objective 
function with different weights for different quantiles. To illustrate, the special case of regression at the 50
th
 
percentile (i.e., median regression) is described by the following objective: min𝑎,𝑏 ∑ |𝑦𝑖 − 𝑎 − 𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑏|. More 
generally, to estimate the association at any other specified percentile of the Y distribution, quantile regression 
minimizes the following objective with asymmetric weights that are determined by the parameter c: 
min𝛼∈ℝ,𝛽∈ℝ𝐾 ∑ 𝑐𝜏(𝑦𝑖 − 𝛼 − 𝒙𝒊
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝜷), where 𝜏 is the quantile (i.e., percentile) of interest, u is the error estimate, 
𝑐𝜏(𝑢) = (𝜏1[𝑢 ≥ 0] + (1 − 𝜏)1[𝑢 < 0])|𝑢| = (𝜏 − 1[𝑢 < 0])𝑢, and 1[*] is the “indicator function” that equals one 
if the bracketed condition regarding u is true and zero otherwise. (See Imbens, Guido W. and Jeffrey M. 
Wooldridge, 2007, Lecture Notes 14, Summer ’07, available at http://www.nber.org/WNE/lect_14_quantile.pdf, for 
a further discussion.) 
12
 Following Koenker and Hallock (2011), we both tabulate and graph the coefficient estimates at decile intervals to 
show the relationship across the entire support of the tax avoidance distribution. We also report OLS coefficient 
estimates of the conditional mean for comparative purposes. 
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tax planning that is potentially payable to the tax authorities upon audit. Because the UTB 
represents an aggregation of multiple tax positions, it is highly visible to the board. In addition, 
directors can easily compare a firm’s UTB to that of its peers to gauge whether management is 
over- or under-investing in tax planning.  
 Our second proxy for tax avoidance is TAETR, which is the difference between the firm’s 
three-year average GAAP effective tax rate (hereafter, ETR, computed as the firm’s total tax 
expense scaled by pre-tax income) and the three-year average GAAP ETR of the firm's size and 
industry peers (i.e., those in the same quintile of total assets in the same Fama-French 48 
industry). This measure of tax avoidance captures cross-sectional variation in firms’ total tax 
planning (including both timing and permanent differences), and benchmarks a given firm’s tax 
aggressiveness relative to that of similar-sized firms in the same industry (see Balakrishnan et al., 
2012). Similar to the UTB, a firm’s ETR is a highly visible summary measure of tax planning 
that the board can monitor and evaluate. By comparing a firm’s ETR to that of its peers, we are 
effectively performing a cross-sectional comparison that the board could make to determine 
whether the firm is investing too much or too little in tax planning activities.
13
 
      LogNumFinExp is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of financial experts on 
the board in the previous year (as indicated by RiskMetrics). We use the number rather than the 
proportion of financial experts on the board because we believe that the former better captures 
how the tax expertise of the board as a whole is determined by a subset of specialists.
14
 For 
example, we believe that a board with two financial experts out of ten total members is more 
                                                          
13
 One potential concern is that both of our measures of tax avoidance include accounting accruals. Accordingly, an 
alternative explanation of our results is that the boards do not monitor tax planning, but rather managers’ accounting 
decisions. Although this explanation is consistent with our results, it is also requires that boards have detailed 
knowledge of their firm’s tax positions to ascertain whether management’s accounting choices are conservative (in 
the right tail) or aggressive (left tail).  
14
 We observe similar results (untabulated) when we use the proportion rather than the number of financial experts 
on the board. 
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likely to have more tax expertise than a board with one financial expert out of five total 
members. The proportion of financial experts, which is a common measure of boards’ financial 
expertise, would treat these two scenarios as equivalent. However, we believe that the board has 
a better pool of expertise in the former scenario.  
PctIndep is the proportion of independent directors in the previous year (as indicated by 
Equilar). LogNumDirs is the natural logarithm of one plus the total number of directors on the 
board in the previous year (as indicated by Equilar). LogCEOPortDelta is the natural logarithm 
of the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the CEO’s equity portfolio value for a 1% increase in stock 
price (Core and Guay, 2002) during the previous year.
 
 As discussed earlier, portfolio delta 
measures the change in the CEO’s wealth that relates to changes in stock price. 
LogCEOPortVega is the natural logarithm of one plus the (risk-neutral) dollar change in CEO 
equity portfolio value for a 0.01 increase in annual stock return volatility (Core and Guay, 2002) 
during the previous year.
15
 Portfolio vega measures the change in the CEO’s wealth that relates 
to changes in stock price risk (i.e., return volatility).   
We also control for economic determinants of firms’ tax positions by including variables 
that are common in the tax literature that capture costs, benefits, and opportunities to engage in 
tax avoidance. CFOps is cash flow from operations divided by average total assets in the 
previous year; LogMVE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity in the 
previous year; LogForAssets is the natural logarithm of total foreign assets (Oler et al., 2007) in 
the previous year; GeoComp is a revenue-based Hirfindahl-Hirschman index that captures 
                                                          
15
 The value of a CEO’s stock and restricted stock is assumed to change dollar-for-dollar with changes in the price 
of the underlying stock. The value of a CEO’s stock options is assumed to change according to the option’s delta 
(vega), which is the derivative of its Black-Scholes value with respect to price (return volatility). Annualized return 
volatility is calculated using continuously compounded monthly returns during the previous 36 months, with a 
minimum of 12 months of returns. The risk-free rate is calculated using the interpolated interest rate on a Treasury 
Note that is closest in maturity to the remaining life of the option multiplied by 0.70 to account for the prevalence of 
early option exercise. Dividend yield is calculated as the dividends paid during the previous twelve months scaled 
by the stock price at the beginning of the month.  
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within-firm geographic segment complexity (Bushman et al., 2004) in the previous year; and i 
and t index the firm and fiscal year, respectively.  
Panel C of Table 1 reports the mean values of CEO equity incentives (i.e., CEOPortDelta 
and CEOPortVega) for each decile of the unconditional tax avoidance distribution (where tax 
avoidance is measured as EndFin48Bal). Table 1 Panel C indicates that CEO equity incentives 
tend to increase with the level of tax avoidance. Table 1 Panel D reports Pearson correlations 
between the primary variables. Note that tax avoidance is associated with cash flow from 
operations, the amount of foreign assets, and the degree of geographic complexity, which 
underscores the importance of controlling for these factors in our multivariate specifications. 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 and Figure 2 present our primary results regarding the relation between corporate 
governance—including CEO equity incentives—and tax avoidance. We first consider the 
relation between CEO equity incentives and tax avoidance. OLS estimates of the conditional 
mean of tax avoidance presented in Panel A of Table 2 provide no evidence of a relation between 
TaxPosition and LogCEOPortDelta. In particular, the estimated coefficient is 0.0001 (t-stat of 
0.46) when tax avoidance is measured with EndFin48Bal and is -0.0035 (t-stat of -1.56) when 
tax avoidance is measured as TAETR. Consistent with Rego and Wilson (2012), OLS estimates 
provide evidence of a positive relation between TaxPosition and LogCEOPortVega, particularly 
when tax avoidance is measured with EndFin48Bal (coefficient of 0.0004 and t-stat of 4.44). 
Figure 2 Panel A plots the quantile regression coefficient estimates from Table 2 Panel A. 
In general, the patterns indicate that the relation between CEOs’ equity incentives and tax 
avoidance is generally positive and increasing in magnitude in the right tail of the distribution. 
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This pattern is particularly pronounced for LogCEOPortVega, which measures CEOs’ equity 
risk-taking incentives. Tests of differences in coefficients across the quantiles when tax 
avoidance is measured as EndFin48Bal indicate that the coefficient at the 90
th
 percentile is 
significantly larger than the coefficient at the 50
th
 percentile (p-value of 0.002), which, in turn, is 
significantly larger than the coefficient at the 10
th
 percentile (p-value of 0.000). This observed 
positive relation is consistent with equity incentives being an important determinant of 
TaxPosition. Moreover, depending on whether observed equity incentives are “optimal,” the 
large differences at the extremes of the tax aggressiveness distribution are consistent with 
unresolved agency problems with respect to tax avoidance.  
Figure 2 Panel B and Table 2 Panel B both present results for the relation between tax 
avoidance and board expertise and independence. We focus first on LogNumFinExp, which is 
our proxy for the financial sophistication on the board. We expect that more sophisticated boards 
are better able to assess when the firm might be over- or under-investing in tax avoidance, and 
will therefore have a greater effect on the firm’s tax avoidance at extreme levels of tax 
avoidance. Consequently, we expect to observe a positive relation between LogNumFinExp and 
TaxPosition in the left tail and a negative relation in the right tail of the tax avoidance 
distribution.  
The OLS estimates in Panel B of Table 2 provide no evidence of a statistical relation 
between TaxPosition and LogNumFinExp for either tax avoidance measure. The OLS coefficient 
is -0.0009 (t-stat of -0.96) when EndFin48Bal is the measure of tax avoidance and is -0.0089 (t-
stat of -1.08) when TAETR is the measure of tax avoidance. In contrast, Figure 2 shows that the 
relation between the financial expertise of the board and both measures of tax avoidance differs 
across their respective distributions. Specifically, the relation between financial expertise and tax 
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avoidance is positive in the left tail but negative in the right tail. Tests of coefficient differences 
across quantiles indicate that the coefficient at the 90
th
 percentile (t-stat of -1.94) is significantly 
more negative than the coefficient at both the 10
th
 (t-stat of 5.58, difference p-value of 0.014) and 
the 50
th
 percentiles (t-stat of 1.33, difference p-value of 0.011) when EndFin48Bal is the measure 
of tax avoidance. This result is consistent with our hypothesis and indicates that boards’ financial 
sophistication does not have a uniform relation with tax avoidance, but that the relation differs 
according to the level of tax avoidance.
16
 Moreover, the quantile regression estimates indicate 
that OLS estimates of the conditional mean are not representative of the relation at other points 
of the tax avoidance distribution. Therefore, generalizing based on OLS estimates of the 
conditional mean provides a misleading picture of the relation between this important 
governance mechanism and tax avoidance.  
Next we consider PctIndep, which measures board independence and has been used as a 
proxy for the amount of board monitoring and oversight of management. Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006) suggest that agency problems may arise with respect to tax avoidance which would occur 
if shareholders and managers evaluate the costs and benefits of tax avoidance differently. If more 
independent boards can better identify and mitigate these agency problems, then we expect to 
observe a positive (negative) relation in the left (right) tail of the tax avoidance distribution. 
The OLS estimates presented in Panel B of Table 2 provide no evidence of a relation 
between TaxPosition and PctIndep. The coefficient is -0.0014 (t-stat of -0.46) when TaxPosition 
is measured with EndFin48Bal and 0.0103 (t-stat of 0.37) when TaxPosition is measured with 
TAETR. However, similar to our results for LogNumFinExp, the quantile regression coefficient 
estimates in Table 2 and the corresponding graph in Figure 2 provide some evidence that the 
                                                          
16
 This result is consistent with the hypothesis that sophisticated board members affect tax policy decisions at 
extreme levels of tax avoidance. An alternative inference is that sophisticated directors do not affect tax policy 
decisions, but instead affect the tax accruals that are reported by managers. 
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relation between board independence and tax avoidance differs across the tax avoidance 
distribution. Tests of coefficient differences across quantiles indicate that the coefficient at the 
90
th
 percentile (t-stat of -2.28) is significantly more negative than the coefficient at the 50
th
 
percentile (t-stat of 2.01, difference p-value of 0.005) when TAETR is the TaxPosition proxy. 
This pattern is consistent with our hypothesis that more independent boards alleviate over- and 
under-investment in tax avoidance, which is one potential symptom of unresolved agency 
problems with respect to tax planning.  
Although the results in Table 2 and Figure 2 provide insight into the relation between 
firms’ governance attributes and tax avoidance, we acknowledge that our inferences are limited 
because variation in firms’ governance structures may not be exogenous with respect to their 
level of tax avoidance. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that our inferences are 
confounded by reverse causality or more general concerns related to correlated omitted variables. 
We considered several ways to address these concerns. First we considered quantile regression 
with instrumental variables (e.g., Frolich and Melly, 2012; Kaplan and Sun, 2013; Powell, 2013). 
However, there is no obvious instrument that satisfies the necessary conditions of being both 
“relevant” (i.e., induces sufficient variation in firms’ governance structures) and “valid” (i.e., 
satisfies the exclusion restriction that requires the instrument to affect firms’ tax avoidance only 
through its effect on their governance structures). Similarly, we are not aware of a suitable 
exogenous shock or “natural experiment” during our sample period that might allow for 
identification of causal effects.  
Regarding the potential for reverse causality, it could be the case that firms’ governance 
structures are designed primarily to influence tax avoidance activity. We believe that tax 
planning is one of many factors that is considered when selecting the design and composition of 
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the board and is therefore, at most, a second-order concern.
17
 Moreover, board composition and 
structure is typically quite stable over time and would therefore be unlikely to change—or at 
least change quickly—in response to changes in the firm’s tax position. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that firms with more aggressive tax positions select more financially sophisticated 
directors specifically to oversee these tax positions. We believe that this scenario is unlikely 
because it predicts not only a positive relation between LogNumFinExp and TaxPosition at both 
high and low levels of tax avoidance, but also a larger positive relation for high levels of tax 
avoidance where financially sophisticated directors would be most beneficial. Our results are 
inconsistent with this scenario.  
We also believe that our research design helps to establish the nature of causality because 
we are not aware of an obvious candidate for an omitted correlated variable that would induce a 
positive relation between LogNumFinExp and TaxPosition for low levels of tax avoidance, but a 
negative relation for high levels of tax avoidance. Nevertheless, as with every observational 
study, our inferences are inherently descriptive. 
 
6. Supplemental Analysis 
6.1. Sensitivity analysis: alternative measures of investment 
As previously discussed, tax avoidance can be view as one of many possible alternative 
risky investment opportunities. If this characterization is accurate, other types of investment 
(e.g., capital expenditures and research and development) should exhibit relations that are similar 
to the one that we document between governance and tax avoidance. Specifically, the relation 
between board financial sophistication and other types of investment should differ across the 
                                                          
17
 This belief is supported by the recent guidance cited above (see supra note 8) that advocates “greater awareness in 
the Boardroom of the importance of tax issues.”   
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investment distribution. Consistent with this conjecture, the estimated coefficients from quantile 
regressions (untabulated) of CAPEX and R&D exhibit patterns that are similar to those reported 
for Tax Avoidance in Figure 2.
18
 This finding suggests that board financial sophistication and 
independence may also ameliorate agency problems that are associated with extreme levels of 
these other risky investment decisions. 
6.2. Sensitivity analysis: evidence of mean reversion in extreme tax avoidance 
If financially sophisticated boards detect and mitigate over- and under-investment in tax 
avoidance, we expect to observe subsequent changes in tax avoidance. To test this conjecture, we 
sort EndFin48Balt-1 into quintiles and examine whether there is a predictable change in the next 
period’s ending FIN 48 balance (EndFin48Balt). In other words, we examine whether firms 
with relatively high (low) levels of tax avoidance subsequently reduce (increase) tax avoidance. 
We then investigate whether this effect—if it exists—is more pronounced for firms that have 
more financial experts and a greater percentage of independent directors on the board.  
In untabulated analysis, we find that firms in the lowest quintile of EndFin48Balt-1 
experience an increase of 0.0015 in the following year when they have at least three financial 
experts on the board. We also find that firms with two or fewer financial experts experience a 
smaller—albeit not statistically different—increase of 0.0008 in the following year. Conversely, 
we find that firms in the highest quintile of EndFin48Bal t-1 experience a decrease of -0.0054 in 
the following year when they have at least three financial experts on the board, and a 
significantly smaller decrease of -0.0011 when there are two or fewer financial experts on the 
board.  
                                                          
18
 We do not observe a similar pattern when ROA is the dependent variable, which suggests that we are not simply 
documenting quantile regression coefficient patterns that are spurious or mechanically determined by a particular 
research design choice.  
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In the lowest quintile of EndFin48Bal t-1, we also observe a change of 0.0010 (0.0009) in 
the following year when the percentage of independent directors on the board is greater (less) 
than the sample median. These changes are not statistically different from each other. In the 
highest quintile, we observe a -0.0028 (-0.0017) change in the following year when the 
percentage of independent directors on the board is greater (less) than the sample median. The 
difference between these changes is marginally significant. Collectively, these results are 
consistent with our conjecture that more financially sophisticated and more independent boards 
are associated with attenuated changes in relatively extreme levels of tax avoidance.
19
 
6.3. Re-examining Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) present evidence that their measures of governance and 
equity-based compensation have an interactive effect on the average level of tax aggression. 
Specifically, they provide evidence (in their Table 4) that there is no statistical relation between 
tax aggressiveness and equity incentives—measured as the annual value of stock option grants 
scaled by total compensation of the firm’s top five executives—in “well governed” firms (i.e., 
firms with low scores on a governance index).
20
 However, they report a significant negative 
relation between tax aggressiveness and equity-based compensation in “poorly governed” firms. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) discuss why it is ambiguous whether equity-based 
compensation provides incentives for managers to engage in more or less aggressive tax 
strategies. They also discuss how it is reasonable to expect that the incentives for tax 
aggressiveness provided by equity-based compensation depend on the firm’s other governance 
                                                          
19
 We also attempt to assess the relation between changes in the number of financial experts on the board and 
subsequent changes in EndFin48Bal. However, there is little variation in the former measure, and the resulting test 
lacked sufficient power. 
20
 Desai and Dharmapala (2006) measure tax aggressiveness as the residual from a regression of the difference 
between book and taxable income on total accruals (see their discussion, pp. 159-160). They also rely on the 
Gompers et al. (2003) “G-index”, which is primarily a measure of shareholder rights with respect to takeovers, as 
their measure of governance quality. We believe that there are more relevant measures of governance quality 
available, particularly as it pertains to firms’ tax avoidance. 
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mechanisms, which can provide either reinforcing or countervailing incentives in the case of 
complements and substitutes, respectively. However, they neither model these complex 
interactions in their research design nor consider whether the relation might differ across the tax 
avoidance distribution. We estimate Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) primary empirical 
specification (i.e., their Table 4 Column (4)) using quantile regression to determine whether the 
relation that they document for the conditional mean is representative of the relation elsewhere in 
the distribution or whether the relation instead differs across the distribution, as our earlier 
findings suggest. 
Figure 3 and Table 3 provide OLS and quantile regression estimates of Desai and 
Dharmapala’s specification for our sample. Our OLS estimates are generally similar to those 
reported in Desai and Dharmapala. Importantly, we are able to replicate their result of a 
(marginally significant) negative coefficient on their measure of equity-based compensation and 
a positive (but insignificant) coefficient when this variable is interacted with an indicator for 
whether the firm is “well governed.”
 
Quantile regression estimates, however, show that the 
interaction between equity-based compensation and “good governance” differs—and, 
importantly, leads to different inferences—across the tax avoidance distribution. Specifically, we 
find that the relation is negative in the right tail of the tax avoidance distribution, which suggests 
that both equity incentives and certain governance mechanisms may, in fact, attenuate aggressive 
tax positions. These results and the corresponding inferences are inconsistent with Desai and 
Dharmapala’s conclusion, but are in line with our results reported in Figure 2 and Table 2. 
Moreover, these results further illustrate the importance of examining how governance relates to 
tax avoidance across its entire distribution to gain a more complete understanding of the nature 
of their relationship.  
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7. Conclusion 
We examine the relation between corporate tax avoidance and corporate governance 
characteristics and managers’ equity incentives. We expand the scope of prior research by 
estimating the relation not only at the conditional mean, but also across the entire tax avoidance 
distribution. Our specific research question relates to the tails of the tax avoidance distribution, 
which represent relatively extreme levels of tax avoidance. The ability to document shifts in the 
relation is particularly important in our research setting because certain governance mechanisms 
are likely to exhibit different relations with tax avoidance at different points in the distribution—
especially if the net benefits of tax avoidance differ at different levels of tax avoidance.  
Consistent with the hypothesis that managers expect greater personal benefits from 
increased tax avoidance (e.g., Rego and Wilson, 2012), we find evidence that risk-taking equity 
incentives are positively related to tax avoidance and that this relation is stronger in the right tail 
of the tax avoidance distribution. This result is consistent with the notion that relatively high 
levels of risk-taking equity incentives have the potential to motivate managers to invest in risky 
tax avoidance beyond the level that is desired by shareholders. We also find evidence that board 
financial sophistication and independence exhibit a positive (negative) relation with tax 
avoidance in the left (right) tail of the tax avoidance distribution. This finding is consistent with 
the hypothesis that more financially sophisticated and more independent boards mitigate agency 
problems related to relatively extreme levels of tax aggressiveness.  
Collectively, our results provide yield a more nuanced understanding of how managerial 
incentives and certain corporate governance mechanisms are related to the level of corporate tax 
avoidance. Our results are also consistent with the notion that, similar to other investments that 
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entail a risk-return tradeoff (i.e., costs and benefits), the optimal level of tax avoidance is 
unlikely to be at the “corner.”  Instead, the optimal level of tax avoidance is more likely to occur 
at an interior point at which the marginal costs and benefits (to managers) equate.  
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Figure 1 
Example of the Effect of Governance on the Tax Avoidance Distribution 
 
This figure illustrates the basic intuition for quantile regression in the context of the relation between Governance 
and Tax Avoidance. The treatment effect of a particular governance mechanism may “rotate” the conditional tax 
avoidance cumulative distribution function (CDF) around the median in a counterclockwise manner. Such an effect 
would manifest as a negative (positive) coefficient on governance in the right (left) tail of the tax avoidance 
distribution. However, the coefficient on governance at the median (i.e., the central location) would be zero. Since 
traditional OLS or median regression only estimates the relationship at the “center” of the distribution (i.e., the mean 
and median, respectively), these techniques cannot detect shifts that occur in other locations of the distribution of 
interest. In contrast, quantile regression is much more general and is designed to characterize changes in both the 
location and shape of the distribution of interest. 
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Figure 2 
Coefficient Estimates at Various Quantiles of the Tax Avoidance Distribution 
 
Panel A: CEO Incentives 
TaxPosition = EndFin48Bal  X = LogCEOPortDelta TaxPosition = TAETR  X = LogCEOPortDelta 
  
TaxPosition = EndFin48Bal  X = LogCEOPortVega TaxPosition = TAETR  X = LogCEOPortVega 
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Figure 2 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Board Expertise and Independence 
TaxPosition = EndFin48Bal  X = LogNumFinExp TaxPosition = TAETR  X = LogNumFinExp 
  
TaxPosition = EndFin48Bal  X = PctIndep TaxPosition = TAETR  X = PctIndep 
  
This figure plots quantile regression coefficient estimates at various quantiles of the tax avoidance distribution. 
Panels A and B correspond to estimates reported in Panels A and B of Table 2. EndFin48Bal is measured as the 
firm’s ending balance of the uncertain tax benefit account (Compustat TXTUBEND), scaled by the firm’s average 
assets over the period. TAETR is computed as the mean three-year GAAP ETR (computed as the firm’s total tax 
expense scaled by pre-tax income) of the firm's size and industry peers minus the firm's three-year GAAP ETR. Size 
peers are firms within the same quintile of total assets and industry peers are firms within the same Fama-French 48 
industry portfolios. PctIndep is the percentage of independent directors to total directors sitting on the board in the 
previous year (as indicated by Equilar). LogNumFinExp is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of financial 
experts designated on the board of directors in the year preceding the fiscal year (as indicated by RiskMetrics). 
CEOPortDelta (CEOPortVega) is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the firm CEO’s equity portfolio value for a 1% 
change in the value (volatility) of the firm’s stock price (Core and Guay, 2002). LogCEOPortDelta 
(LogCEOPortVega) is the natural logarithm of CEOPortDelta (CEOPortVega). 
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Figure 3 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) Quantile Regression 
Table 4 (All Firms) 
StkMixGrant * WellGov 
 
Coefficient plot for StkMixGrant * WellGov from quantile regression estimation of Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
Table 4, Column (4). The following equation is estimated (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, adjusted to include a mean 
effect for WellGov):  
TSi,t = 0 + 1STKMIXGRANTi,t + 2(WELLGOVt * STKMIXGRANTi,t) + Other Interaction Terms  
+ Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + Controls + vi,t.    (17) 
TS is the residual estimated from regressing the difference between book and tax income on total accruals (see Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2006 discussion, p. 159-160). StkMixGrant is the ratio of stock option grant value to total 
compensation for the firm’s top five executives. WellGov is a dichotomous variable that equals one for firms that 
have a low governance index score (G-score less than or equal to 7) and equals zero otherwise. Estimation includes 
controlling for the level of deferred taxes and year, firm, and firm-year size fixed effects. 
-0.0120
-0.0100
-0.0080
-0.0060
-0.0040
-0.0020
0.0000
0.0020
0.0040
0.0060
0
.0
5
0
.1
0
0
.1
5
0
.2
0
0
.2
5
0
.3
0
0
.3
5
0
.4
0
0
.4
5
0
.5
0
0
.5
5
0
.6
0
0
.6
5
0
.7
0
0
.7
5
0
.8
0
0
.8
5
0
.9
0
0
.9
5
C
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
e
st
im
at
e
s 
Estimation Quantile 
- 35 - 
 
Table 1 
Panel A:  Descriptive Statistics 
  
n 
Standard 
Deviation 
25
th
 
percentile Mean Median 
75
th
 
percentile 
Tax Position        
EndFin48Bal 4,128 0.025 0.003 0.015 0.008 0.018 
TAETR  3,137 0.198 -0.104 -0.028 -0.031 0.094 
Governance and Incentives        
NumFinExp 4,128 1.273 1.000 1.711 1.000 3.000 
PctIndep 4,128 0.131 0.700 0.773 0.800 0.880 
NumDirs 4,128 2.182 8.000 9.082 9.000 10.000 
CEOPortDelta ($) 4,128 606,123 39,818 330,331 129,767 355,567 
CEOPortVega ($) 4,128 51,095 0.000 16,532 320 106,832 
Controls       
CFOps 4,128 0.096 0.006 0.104 0.103 0.151 
MVE ($millions) 4,128 25,979 532 8,418 1,647 5,419 
ForAssets ($millions) 4,128 57,447 6 5,101 330 1,701 
GeoComp 4,128 1.852 0.324 0.628 0.541 0.985 
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
Panel B:  Descriptive Statistics 
  
Sample % Compustat % 
Industry   
Mining & Construction 2.09 4.09 
Food  2.55 2.06 
Textiles, printing & publishing 5.25 2.86 
Chemicals  3.94 2.33 
Pharmaceuticals 5.18 6.69 
Extractive Industries 3.71 4.70 
Durable Manufacturers 26.67 16.71 
Computers 18.62 12.75 
Transportation 4.64 6.24 
Utilities 3.94 4.69 
Retail 10.90 7.16 
Financial Institutions 2.70 14.77 
Insurance & real estate 1.00 5.37 
Services 8.42 7.62 
Other 0.39 1.94 
   
Firm Characteristic Sample Median Compustat Median 
ROA 0.029 0.005*** 
Book to Mkt 0.509 0.567*** 
LT Debt/Assets 0.156 0.078*** 
Sales/Assets 0.826 0.590*** 
MVE 1,084.391 230.125*** 
   
Industries are classified in accordance with Barth et al. (1998). Sample and Compustat observations are selected for fiscal year 2009, 
which provides the largest contribution of observations (1,294) to the total estimation sample. 
***
 denotes statistically significant 
median differences at the 1% levels using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov non-parametric test. 
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Table 1 
Panel C:  Mean Incentives by Tax Avoidance Decile 
EndFin48Bal  
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Incentives           
CEOPortDelta ($) 135,550 210,512 245,666 271,839 374,635 357,027 389,706 381,002 440,935 496,950 
CEOPortVega ($) 10,791 9,112 13,002 15,121 16,504 20,934 14,654 17,420 21,761 26,040 
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
Panel D: Pearson Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  
EndFin48Bal (1) 
1.0000 0.1264 0.0063 -0.0953 -0.0178 0.0170 0.0626 -0.0015 -0.0491 0.1031 -0.0309 
 <.0001 0.6866 <.0001 0.2532 0.2762 <.0001 0.9239 0.0016 <.0001 0.0474 
TAETR (2) 
0.1264 1.0000 0.0146 -0.0110 -0.0274 -0.0428 0.0467 -0.0243 -0.1133 0.0352 -0.0171 
<.0001  0.4201 0.5432 0.1302 0.0183 0.0100 0.1796 <.0001 0.0524 0.3452 
PctIndep (3) 
0.0063 0.0146 1.0000 0.1795 0.1859 0.1092 0.0898 0.1998 0.0117 0.2012 -0.0332 
0.6866 0.4201  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.4507 <.0001 0.0328 
LogNumDirs (4) 
-0.0953 -0.0110 0.1795 1.0000 0.2799 0.2833 -0.0437 0.5540 0.0410 0.2954 -0.0202 
<.0001 0.5432 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0050 <.0001 0.0085 <.0001 0.1953 
LogNumFinExp (5) 
-0.0178 -0.0274 0.1859 0.2799 1.0000 0.3265 -0.0884 0.4189 0.1238 0.2295 -0.0559 
0.2532 0.1302 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 
LogCEOPortDelta (6) 
0.0170 -0.0428 0.1092 0.2833 0.3265 1.0000 -0.1571 0.6656 0.2635 0.3648 -0.0192 
0.2762 0.0183 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2168 
LogCEOPortVega (7) 
0.0626 0.0467 0.0898 -0.0437 -0.0884 -0.1571 1.0000 -0.2284 -0.1210 -0.0630 0.0384 
<.0001 0.0100 <.0001 0.0050 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0136 
LogMVE (8) 
-0.0015 -0.0243 0.1998 0.5540 0.4189 0.6656 -0.2284 1.0000 0.2818 0.4908 -0.0419 
0.9239 0.1796 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0070 
CFOps (9) 
-0.0491 -0.1133 0.0117 0.0410 0.1238 0.2635 -0.1210 0.2818 1.0000 0.0722 -0.0150 
0.0016 <.0001 0.4507 0.0085 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 0.3370 
LogForAssets (10) 
0.1031 0.0352 0.2012 0.2954 0.2295 0.3648 -0.0630 0.4908 0.0722 1.0000 -0.1047 
<.0001 0.0524 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 
GeoComp (11) 
-0.0309 -0.0171 -0.0332 -0.0202 -0.0559 -0.0192 0.0384 -0.0419 -0.0150 -0.1047 1.0000 
0.0474 0.3452 0.0328 0.1953 0.0003 0.2168 0.0136 0.0070 0.3370 <.0001  
EndFin48Bal is measured as the firm’s ending balance of the uncertain tax benefit account (Compustat TXTUBEND), scaled by the firm’s average 
assets over the period. TAETR is computed as the mean three-year GAAP ETR (computed as the firm’s total tax expense scaled by pre-tax income) of 
the firm's size and industry peers minus the firm's three-year GAAP ETR. Size peers are firms within the same quintile of total assets and industry peers 
are firms within the same Fama-French 48 industry portfolios. PctIndep is the percentage of independent directors to total directors sitting on the board 
in the previous year (as indicated by Equilar). LogNumDirs is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of total directors sitting on the board in the 
previous year (as indicated by Equilar). LogNumFinExp is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of financial experts designated on the board of 
directors in the year preceding the fiscal year (as indicated by RiskMetrics). CEOPortDelta (CEOPortVega) is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the 
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firm CEO’s equity portfolio value for a 1% change in the value (volatility) of the firm’s stock price (Core and Guay, 2002) . LogCEOPortDelta  
(LogCEOPortVega) is the natural logarithm of CEOPortDelta (CEOPortVega). LogMVE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity computed 
for the fiscal year. CFOps is cash flow from operations divided by average total assets. LogForAssets is the natural logarithm of total foreign assets 
computed for the fiscal year. GeoComp is a revenue-based Hirfindahl-Hirschman index that captures within-firm geographic segment complexity 
(Bushman et al., 2004) computed for the fiscal year.
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Table 2 
Panel A: CEO Incentives 
TaxPosition = 
n = 
X = 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
LogCEOPortDelta 
TAETR 
3,137 
LogCEOPortDelta 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
LogCEOPortVega 
TAETR 
3,137 
LogCEOPortVega 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
OLS 0.0001 0.46 -0.0035 -1.56 0.0004 4.44 0.0014 1.69 
Quantile         
0.10 0.0001 3.00 -0.0051 -2.30 0.0000 4.02 -0.0031 -2.66 
0.20 0.0002 3.33 -0.0031 -1.68 0.0001 4.81 -0.0006 -0.87 
0.30 0.0002 2.35 -0.0014 -0.88 0.0001 5.59 0.0010 1.84 
0.40 0.0001 1.03 -0.0011 -1.06 0.0001 3.35 0.0014 2.35 
0.50 0.0002 1.37 -0.0014 -1.12 0.0002 3.69 0.0022 3.85 
0.60 0.0003 1.36 -0.0019 -1.22 0.0002 5.40 0.0033 5.04 
0.70 0.0001 0.21 -0.0024 -1.30 0.0004 4.70 0.0045 5.65 
0.80 0.0002 0.64 -0.0004 -0.15 0.0006 4.70 0.0049 4.85 
0.90 0.0008 1.94 -0.0013 -0.44 0.0009 5.02 0.0030 3.21 
         
Avg Pseudo R2  0.039  0.046  0.039  0.000 
Q(0.80) = Q(0.20)  0.989  0.309  0.000  0.000 
Q(0.90) = Q(0.10)  0.097  0.213  0.000  0.000 
Q(0.90) = Q(0.50)  0.144  0.975  0.002  0.301 
Q(0.10) = Q(0.50)  0.374  0.044  0.000  0.018 
         
 
Panel B: Board Expertise and Independence 
TaxPosition = 
n = 
X = 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
LogNumFinExp 
TAETR 
3,137 
LogNumFinExp 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
PctIndep 
TAETR 
3,137 
PctIndep 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
OLS -0.0009 -0.96 -0.0089 -1.08 -0.0014 -0.46 0.0103 0.37 
Quantile         
0.10 0.0005 5.58 0.0152 1.08 0.0009 2.50 -0.0274 -0.84 
0.20 0.0008 6.57 0.0056 0.73 0.0005 0.88 0.0236 0.97 
0.30 0.0007 3.59 0.0011 0.18 0.0015 2.13 0.0275 1.55 
0.40 0.0009 2.30 -0.0044 -0.67 0.0021 2.04 0.0384 2.30 
0.50 0.0006 1.33 -0.0120 -1.85 0.0025 2.14 0.0426 2.01 
0.60 0.0004 0.61 -0.0144 -1.91 0.0014 0.61 0.0388 1.68 
0.70 0.0004 0.55 -0.0167 -2.41 0.0023 0.95 0.0153 0.48 
0.80 -0.0008 -0.69 -0.0100 -0.99 0.0043 1.35 0.0021 0.05 
0.90 -0.0040 -1.94 -0.0027 -0.32 -0.0009 -0.15 -0.0707 -2.28 
         
Avg Pseudo R2  0.039  0.046  0.039  0.046 
Q(0.80) = Q(0.20)  0.173  0.254  0.215  0.425 
Q(0.90) = Q(0.10)  0.014  0.394  0.174  0.604 
Q(0.90) = Q(0.50)  0.011  0.314  0.568  0.005 
Q(0.10) = Q(0.50)  0.772  0.125  0.094  0.016 
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Table 2 (cont’d) 
Panel C: Control Variables 
TaxPosition = 
n = 
X = 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
LogNumDirs 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
LogMVE 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
CFOps 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
LogForAssets 
EndFin48Bal 
4,128 
GeoComp 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
OLS -0.0159 -8.26 0.0008 2.07 -0.0155 -3.68 0.0010 7.29 -0.0003 -1.47 
Quantile           
0.10 0.0002 1.04 0.0000 0.37 0.0006 1.76 0.0002 6.50 -0.0001 -0.48 
0.20 -0.0004 -1.21 0.0002 3.00 0.0007 1.57 0.0003 7.31 -0.0002 -0.49 
0.30 -0.0010 -2.57 0.0004 3.72 0.0008 1.05 0.0005 8.65 -0.0000 -0.07 
0.40 -0.0020 -3.05 0.0005 2.63 0.0006 0.34 0.0006 7.87 -0.0001 -0.06 
0.50 -0.0050 -4.36 0.0008 4.31 -0.0012 -0.57 0.0007 5.32 -0.0001 -0.08 
0.60 -0.0094 -7.68 0.0013 4.62 -0.0025 -0.95 0.0008 4.67 -0.0002 -0.09 
0.70 -0.0136 -7.92 0.0016 4.02 -0.0041 -0.75 0.0009 4.06 -0.0002 -0.09 
0.80 -0.0177 -6.22 0.0018 3.35 -0.0118 -1.67 0.0013 3.65 -0.0002 -0.04 
0.90 -0.0349 -8.28 0.0024 2.66 -0.0291 -2.54 0.0015 2.93 -0.0004 -0.07 
           
 
TaxPosition = 
n = 
X = 
TAETR 
3,137 
LogNumDirs 
TAETR 
3,137 
LogMVE 
TAETR 
3,137 
CFOps 
TAETR 
3,137 
LogForAssets 
TAETR 
3,137 
GeoComp 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
OLS -0.0175 -0.98 0.0036 1.05 -0.2108 -5.77 0.0033 2.71 -0.0015 -0.90 
Quantile           
0.10 -0.0367 -1.43 0.0324 7.86 -0.0298 -0.51 -0.0051 -3.63 -0.0027 -0.34 
0.20 0.0023 0.18 0.0167 6.39 -0.1879 -4.48 0.0001 0.11 -0.0048 -0.56 
0.30 0.0103 0.81 0.0100 4.86 -0.2257 -7.74 0.0024 2.49 -0.0059 -0.59 
0.40 0.0028 0.22 0.0077 3.61 -0.2800 -12.12 0.0045 3.97 -0.0066 -0.45 
0.50 0.0043 0.41 0.0003 0.14 -0.2975 -9.11 0.0064 6.53 -0.0073 -0.65 
0.60 -0.0163 -1.06 -0.0072 -2.95 -0.3026 -9.23 0.0090 9.17 -0.0043 -0.51 
0.70 -0.0182 -0.89 -0.0137 -5.27 -0.2797 -8.58 0.0108 11.14 0.0024 0.38 
0.80 -0.0053 -0.21 -0.0228 -6.14 -0.2592 -4.18 0.0115 8.23 0.0015 0.25 
0.90 0.0310 1.37 -0.0220 -5.54 -0.1709 -2.95 0.0039 2.23 0.0006 0.08 
           
EndFin48Bal is measured as the firm’s ending balance of the uncertain tax benefit account (Compustat 
TXTUBEND), scaled by the assets. TAETR is computed as the mean three-year GAAP ETR (computed as the firm’s 
total tax expense scaled by pre-tax income) of the firm's size and industry peers minus the firm's three-year GAAP 
ETR. Size peers are firms within the same quintile of total assets and industry peers are firms within the same Fama-
French 48 industry portfolios. PctIndep is the percentage of independent directors to total directors sitting on the 
board in the previous year (as indicated by Equilar). LogNumFinExp is the natural logarithm of one plus the number 
of financial experts designated on the board of directors in the year preceding the fiscal year (as indicated by 
RiskMetrics). CEOPortDelta (CEOPortVega) is the (risk-neutral) dollar change in the firm CEO’s equity portfolio 
value for a 1% change in the value (volatility) of the firm’s stock price (Core and Guay, 2002). LogCEOPortDelta 
(LogCEOPortVega) is the natural logarithm of one plus CEOPortDelta (CEOPortVega). Two-sided p-values are 
reported for the tests of coefficient differences between quintiles 0.80 vs. 0.20 and 0.90 vs. 0.10. 
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Table 3 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) Quantile Regression 
Table 4 (All Firms) 
 StkMixGrant WellGov StkMixGrant * WellGov 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
OLS -0.0086 -1.60 0.0323 0.57 0.0016 0.18 
Quantile       
0.05 0.0025 1.50 0.0081 0.01 0.0046 1.11 
0.10 0.0025 0.86 0.0081 0.01 0.0046 0.76 
0.15 0.0029 0.82 0.0102 0.01 0.0012 0.15 
0.20 0.0022 0.56 0.0081 0.01 0.0009 0.11 
0.25 0.0020 0.50 0.0090 0.03 -0.0007 -0.09 
0.30 0.0012 0.34 0.0175 0.13 -0.0023 -0.27 
0.35 0.0006 0.16 0.0186 0.29 -0.0035 -0.50 
0.40 0.0000 0.01 0.0064 0.12 -0.0039 -0.47 
0.45 -0.0002 -0.07 0.0044 0.09 -0.0038 -0.51 
0.50 -0.0004 -0.11 0.0016 0.04 -0.0032 -0.45 
0.55 0.0007 0.24 -0.0004 -0.01 -0.0041 -0.60 
0.60 0.0011 0.36 0.0079 0.18 -0.0028 -0.41 
0.65 0.0014 0.35 0.0086 0.15 -0.0040 -0.52 
0.70 0.0015 0.39 0.0048 0.04 -0.0044 -0.63 
0.75 0.0023 0.53 0.0065 0.02 -0.0065 -0.84 
0.80 0.0022 0.53 0.0059 0.01 -0.0077 -0.80 
0.85 0.0014 0.46 0.0211 0.02 -0.0109 -1.65 
0.90 -0.0006 -0.24 0.0253 0.02 -0.0080 -1.52 
0.95 -0.0006 -0.47 0.0262 0.02 -0.0079 -2.65 
Replication of Desai and Dharmapala (2006) Table 4, Column (4) using quantile regression estimation. The 
following equation is estimated (equation 17 from Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, adjusted to include a mean effect 
for WellGov which was mistakenly excluded from their specification): 
  TSi,t = STKMIXGRANTi,t + (WELLGOVi * STKMIXGRANTi,t) 
 + Other Interaction Terms + Firm Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + Controls + i,t 
 
TS is the residual estimated from regressing the difference between book and tax income on total accruals (see Desai 
and Dharmapala, 2006, 159-160). StkMixGrant is the ratio of stock option grant value to total compensation for the 
firm’s top five executives. WellGov is a dichotomous variable that equals one for firms that have a low governance 
index score (G-score less than or equal to 7) and equals zero otherwise. Estimation includes controlling for the level 
of deferred taxes and year, firm, and firm-year size fixed effects. 
 
